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Elizabeth E. Joh* 
 
Carpenter v. United States1 is a case riddled with ironies.  A man accused of 
participating in the robberies of cellphone stores finds himself incriminated by his 
own cellphone.  Several of the Justices—three of whom were born during the Great 
Depression—take note of the ubiquity of cellphones in our daily lives.  The various 
opinions refer to the Cyber Age, eighteenth century dictionaries, and everything in 
between.  For court watchers, this was a hotly debated case about the third-party 
exception to the Fourth Amendment that ultimately had little to do with that doctrine 
at all.  The decision to find Fourth Amendment protections in the government’s 
collection of a person’s movements acknowledges that rapid advances in technology 
are changing Fourth Amendment boundaries.  Lower courts are already grappling 
with how to apply Carpenter’s new protections.2 
But let’s turn instead to a different aspect of the Carpenter decision.  On its 
own terms, the majority opinion resolved a “narrow” question about the 
government’s collection of cellphone location information collected and stored by a 
customer’s wireless carrier.3  Chief Justice Roberts focuses on the quality of the 
information sought by the police as a means of deciding the case in Carpenter’s 
favor.4  Less obviously, however, the majority opinion also stresses the nature of the 
policing involved in Carpenter’s case: new technologies that do more than enhance 
human abilities.  The majority makes no explicit claims about this focus.  But the 
Carpenter decision reveals the Supreme Court’s first set of views on how it might 
evaluate police use of artificial intelligence.  That contention, and the questions it 
raises, form the subject of this essay. 
 
                                                                                                                       
*   Professor of Law, U.C. Davis School of Law.  Many thanks to the Ohio State Journal of 
Criminal Law for the invitation to contribute to this volume, and to Ryan Calo, Dean Alan Michaels, 
and Charles Reichmann for helpful comments. 
1   138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
2   See, e.g., Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. Naperville, 900 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(finding public utility readings at 15-minute intervals of home electricity use constitutes a “search”). 
3   138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“Our decision today is a narrow one.”). 
4   Id. at 2217. 
282  OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW  [Vol. 16:281 
I. TIMOTHY CARPENTER AND THE TATTLING CELLPHONE 
 
Timothy Carpenter and his half-brother (also improbably named) Timothy 
Sanders assembled a loose crew of changing characters to rob seven cellphone stores 
near Detroit and nearby Warren, Ohio.5 After one of the participants in the robberies 
confessed to the crimes and provided the cellphone numbers of the others, FBI 
agents applied for an order under the federal Stored Communications Act,6 rather 
than a warrant premised on probable cause.  The government sought cell-site 
location information from these cellphones during the period when the crimes 
occurred.7 
That location information would have provided clues as to the defendants’ 
whereabouts.  Cellphones continuously seek a signal, usually from the closest cell-
site tower.8  Each connection generates a record about the time and location of 
connections between a user’s cellphone and a particular cell-site.  In that way, these 
records provide a detailed map of where you have been.9  This cell-site location 
information is stored as a matter of course by most wireless carriers.10 
In Carpenter’s case, the court orders to Metro PCS and Sprint resulted in the 
production of 12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter’s movements during the 
four month period when the cellphone store robberies took place.11  At Carpenter’s 
trial, an FBI Agent created maps showing that Carpenter’s phone—and Carpenter 
by implication—was close to the vicinity of the robberies at the time when they 
occurred.12  A jury convicted Carpenter on Hobbes Act and federal firearms 
charges.13 
The Sixth Circuit rejected Carpenter’s claim that the collection of this cell-site 
location information amounted to a search under the Fourth Amendment and thus 
                                                                                                                       
5   United States v. Carpenter, No. 12-20218, 2014 WL 943094, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 11, 
2014); United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016). 
6   18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2018). 
7   138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
8   Id. at 2211. 
9   Id. at 2217 (noting that cell-site location information provides “detailed and comprehensive 
record of the person’s movements”). 
10  Id. at 2212 (observing that wireless carriers collect this data “for their own business 
purposes” and that “they often sell aggregated location records to data brokers, without individual 
identifying information from the transmission of text messages and routine data connections.”). 
11  Id. 
12  United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 885 (“With the cell-site data provided by 
Carpenter’s and Sanders’s wireless carriers, Hess created maps showing that Carpenter’s and Sanders’s 
phones were within a half-mile to two miles of the location of each of the robberies around the time 
the robberies happened.”). 
13  18 U.S.C. 924(c) (2018); 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) (2018); 138 S. Ct. at 2216. 
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required a warrant rather than a court order under the Stored Communications Act.  
The government’s collection of this data from Carpenter’s wireless carriers fell 
plainly, in the court’s view, under the existing third-party exception to the Fourth 
Amendment.14  Cell phone data—even it if revealed a time machine into Carpenter’s 
whereabouts15—were no different than other business records voluntarily conveyed 
to third parties and thus without Fourth Amendment protection. 
The Supreme Court struck a different path.  The Chief Justice acknowledged 
the potential applicability of two lines of decisions: both the third-party doctrine and 
the privacy-in-public cases.  The third-party cases like Smith v. Maryland emphasize 
that information voluntarily provided to third parties like banks or phone companies 
loses Fourth Amendment protection.16  Similarly, in cases like United States v. 
Knotts the Court denied Fourth Amendment protection for one’s movements in 
public.17 
Neither group of cases proved to be critical to the Carpenter decision.  Instead, 
the majority opinion focused on the “unique nature of cellphone location records” 
to conclude that “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI.”  Such information, 
capable of providing an “all-encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts,” 
constitutes a “qualitatively different category” of information warranting Fourth 
Amendment protection.18  The majority rebuked the government for “fail[ing] to 
contend with the seismic shifts in digital technology,” just as it had in Riley v. 
California just four years earlier.19 
Having concluded that the collection of cell-site location data counted as a 
Fourth Amendment search, the Carpenter majority decided that a court order under 
the Stored Communications Act was insufficient.  Absent an “urgent situation” 
excusing its absence, law enforcement collection of cell-site location information 
                                                                                                                       
14  See 819 F.3d at 888 (“This case involves business records obtained from a third party, which 
can only diminish the defendants’ expectation of privacy in the information those records contain.”). 
15  See United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (“With access to CSLI, the Government 
can now travel back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts, subject only to the retention policies of 
the wireless carriers . . . .”). 
16  442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (“When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed 
numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in 
the ordinary course of business. . . .” “This analysis dictates that petition can claim no legitimate 
expectation of privacy here.”). 
17  460 U.S. 276, 276 (1983) (“A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements.”). 
18  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216–17. 
19  134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014) (“The United States asserts that a search of all data stored on a 
cell phone is ‘materially indistinguishable’ from searches of these sorts of physical items.  That is like 
saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.”). 
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must be obtained with a warrant.20  By identifying a search and requiring a warrant, 
the decision counters the government’s “powerful new tool” to investigate with a 
Fourth Amendment recalibration.21  The majority reversed the Sixth Circuit’s 
judgment in this case.22 
 
II. POLICING AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
Plotting geographic data on a literal map for a jury evokes little of the futurism 
associated with the term “artificial intelligence.” Loosely defined as the use of 
machines to approximate human thinking,23 artificial intelligence already envelopes 
our daily lives—including the use of iPhone autocorrect, social media photo tagging, 
and the recommendations that guide what to watch, what to buy, and whom to date.  
The future is likely to include robotic caregivers, autonomous vehicles, and 
machine-driven medical diagnostics. 
The availability of massive amounts of data, leaps in computing power, and 
increasingly sophisticated algorithms have begun to change policing as well.  We 
might define the use of AI in policing as the growing use of technologies that apply 
algorithms to large sets of data to either assist human police work or to replace it.24  
And assistance is something of a misnomer.  Artificial intelligence has begun to 
                                                                                                                       
20  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
21  This is essentially the thesis of Orin Kerr’s equilibrium adjustment theory.  See Orin S. Kerr, 
An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 126 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011).  Even 
the author agrees: Orin Kerr (@OrinKerr), Twitter (Jul. 26, 2018, 1:03 PM), https://twitter.com/
OrinKerr/status/1022573224976994304. 
22  There were four dissents in the case.  Two in particular are noteworthy.  Justice Kennedy 
found little to distinguish the collection of cell-site location information from “other kinds of business 
records the Government has the lawful right to obtain by compulsory process.”  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2224 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  That analogy is remarkably similar to Kennedy’s refusal to 
distinguish between fingerprints and DNA samples in Maryland v. King, another case in which 
technological advances raised questions about the limits of existing Fourth Amendment doctrine.  See 
569 U.S. 435, 436–37 (2013) (finding few differences between fingerprint and DNA sample 
collection).  Justice Alito’s dissent points to another important question raised in the Carpenter 
majority: whether the decision alters existing doctrines about Fourth Amendment standing.  See 
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2247 (noting that the Court permitting “a defendant to object to the search of 
a third party’s property” is “revolutionary”). 
23  Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
399, 404 (2017) (“There is no straightforward, consensus definition of artificial intelligence.  AI is best 
understood as a set of techniques aimed at approximating some aspect of human or animal cognition 
using machines.”).  Many computer scientists have understandably found fault with the imprecision 
with which the terms artificial intelligence and algorithms have been used in non-technical writing.  
For the purposes of this essay, however, the general but somewhat vague definition will have to do. 
24  Elizabeth E. Joh, Artificial Intelligence and Policing: First Questions, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
1139 (2018). 
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change the capabilities of the police by permitting them to do what was once nearly 
impossible or impracticable. 
One change already ushered in by artificial intelligence is an expansion in what 
we might call the “surveillance discretion” of the police.25  Surveillance discretion 
refers to the decisional freedom of the police to pay attention to some person or 
persons rather than others—an uncontroversial aspect of ordinary policing.26  
Resource constraints always checked traditional surveillance discretion: there are 
never enough officers nor enough money for cameras and other machines.  But 
machine-generated analyses have changed that calculus.  The police today enjoy a 
surfeit of data that can be collected, stored, mined, and sifted through easily and 
cheaply: license plate data, social media posts, social networks, and soon our own 
faces. 
The mass collection of this data would be largely useless without quick, cheap, 
and easy ways to find connections and patterns.  Whether we call it the age of 
algorithms, big data, or AI, today law enforcement agencies can increasingly turn to 
tools that enable them to sort through this data to look for persons already identified, 
or for patterns from as yet unknown persons that indicate suspicious behavior.  
Threat analysis software might comb through private and public records to help an 
officer assess the potential dangerousness of a driver in a routine traffic stop.27  
Social network analysis might identify what persons pose the most likely threat of 
gun violence, either as perpetrator or victim.28 
For now, we might best think of these technologies as tools that enhance the 
abilities of traditional policing.  Predictive policing algorithms help departments 
focus limited human patrol resources, for instance, by highlighting people most 
likely to commit crimes or places where crime is mostly likely to occur.29 But these 
                                                                                                                       
25  Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big Data, and 
Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15 (2016). 
26  Id. at 15. 
27  See, e.g., Justin Jouvenal, The New Way Police are Surveilling You: Calculating Your Threat 
‘Score’, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2016), http://wapo.st/1OcTX3K?tid=ss_
twbottom&utm_term=.d4d455f45465 (Intrado’s Beware software provides police with a threat “score” 
of a person.  Exactly how the software determines this is protected by Intrado as a trade secret.). 
28  The Chicago Police Department employs an algorithm to generate its “Strategic Subjects 
List.” Jeff Asher & Rob Arthur, Inside the Algorithm That Tries to Predict Gun Violence in Chicago, 
N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (June 13, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2tgi63U. 
29  See, e.g., John Eligon & Timothy Williams, Police Program Aims to Pinpoint Those Most 
Likely to Commit Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1R48saA (describing “an 
experiment taking place in dozens of police departments across the country, one in which the authorities 
have turned to complex computer algorithms to try to pinpoint the people most likely to be involved in 
future violent crimes—as either predator or prey.”); Erica Goode, Sending the Police Before There’s a 
Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/us/16police.html 
(describing one program that “generates projections about which areas and windows of time are at 
highest risk for future crimes by analyzing and detecting patterns in years of past crime data.”). 
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applications can go well beyond mere enhancement.  No single officer (nor a single 
department) can scan thousands of private and public records to make an assessment 
of a suspect’s dangerousness.30  No single law enforcement agency has the means to 
personally track every car in town and plot out its movements.  No police department 
can deploy personnel to identify every jaywalker and fine them within seconds.31  In 
these ways the tools of artificial intelligence are changing the nature of policing 
itself. 
Another way to think of this development is that policing is becoming 
increasingly automated.32  Automation may be most frequently associated with jobs 
like truck drivers, cashiers, and file clerks, but many fields will be subjected to 
varying degrees of automation.33  This includes conventional policing.  Certainly, 
many of the most mundane tasks of patrol, including traffic direction and report 
writing, will be delegated to machines.34  But even today the increasing interest in 
social network analysis, locational predictive policing, and threat analysis means 
that even the task of assessing suspicious behavior is subject to automation as well. 
 
III. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN CARPENTER 
 
A central concern in Fourth Amendment law focuses on how the government 
accesses information.  The police generally need a warrant to enter your house, 
whether they want to seize your most personal documents, or merely to look 
around.35  In a pre-digital world, the conceptual premise of the house, mailbox, and 
foot locker made sense. 
Finding Fourth Amendment protections for Carpenter was difficult under the 
Court’s previous decisions because the government accessed none of the defendant’s 
spaces normally protected by the Fourth Amendment.  Instead, the majority opinion 
avoids this difficulty by focusing instead on the nature of the information sought: 
                                                                                                                       
30  About half of American law enforcement agencies employ few than ten full time officers.  
See Brian Reaves, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 
2008 (2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf. 
31  But artificial intelligence can.  See Christina Zhao, Jaywalking in China: Facial Recognition 
Surveillance Will Soon Fine Citizens Via Text Message, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 27, 2018), 
https://www.newsweek.com/jaywalking-china-facial-recognition-
surveillance-will-soon-fine-citizens-text-861401. 
32  Elizabeth E. Joh, Automated Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 559 (2018). 
33  See, e.g., Natalie Kitroeff, Robots Could Replace 1.7 Million American Truckers in the Next 
Decade, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-fi-automated-trucks-labor-
20160924/ (“Trucks without human hands at the wheel could be on American roads within a decade, 
say analysts and industry executives.”). 
34  Elizabeth E. Joh, Automated Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 559 (2018). 
35  Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 279, 
297 (2005). 
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“the qualitatively different category of cell-site records.”36  Location information—
at least some amount of it—can be so revealing that its very existence requires 
traditional Fourth Amendment protections.  Much of the commentary after 
Carpenter will likely take up the question of what other information also falls into 
the same qualitative category of data as cellphone locational information and not the 
unprotected data that the majority loosely defines.37 
But Carpenter does something yet more.  The decision hints that Fourth 
Amendment protections also turn on the nature of the policing that produces the 
information at issue.  What distinguishes the kind of policing in Carpenter from 
traditional methods also happens to describe the emerging ways in which police are 
relying upon artificial intelligence.  Carpenter recognizes, perhaps more so than any 
other Supreme Court decision, that dramatic technological changes will rewrite the 
Fourth Amendment’s constraints on the government’s powers.  In finding that we 
possess Fourth Amendment protections in locational data even when recorded by 
third parties, the Court chose to describe the data collection technique in Carpenter 
as superhuman, passive, and automated.  This is noteworthy: these descriptions also 
characterize the very technologies of artificial intelligence that are becoming more 
commonplace in policing. 
First, the new technologies of policing employ data collection, storage, and 
analysis methods that are both superhuman and cheap.  They are superhuman 
because while human beings could do the same thing, it would be impracticable to 
do so.38  The collection of cell-site location information surpasses “the nosy neighbor 
who keeps an eye on comings and goings.”39  Instead, the technology is “ever alert, 
and [its] memory is nearly infallible.”40  Practical restraints like police staffing 
become much less important when there exist “tireless and absolute surveillance” 
methods available through technology.41 
And even if vastly more efficient and superior to the human resources of an 
average police department, equally important is the affordability of these 
technologies.  Thousands of data points were available to the FBI in Carpenter’s 
case “at practically no expense.”42  The average American police department may 
                                                                                                                       
36  138 S. Ct. at 2216 (emphasis added). 
37  Id. at 2220 (“We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call into question 
conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras.”). 
38  Cf. “Prior to the digital age, law enforcement might have pursued a suspect for a brief stretch, 
but doing so ‘for any extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.’”  
Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment)). 
39  138 S. Ct. at 2219. 
40  Id. 
41  Id. at 2218. 
42  Id. 
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not possess the means to create a real time crime center but increasingly it can buy 
off-the-shelf software or take advantage of data already being collected by third 
parties. Access to these technologies is no longer an option only for the most well-
off municipal departments.  As the Court observed in Carpenter, the collection of 
cell-site location information is “remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient compared to 
traditional investigative tools.”43 
Second, artificial intelligence applications permit the expanding uses of 
surveillance discretion with little additional effort required from the police.  With 
vast amounts of data being collected all the time, “police need not even know in 
advance whether they want to follow a particular individual or when.”44  While 
police will continue to seek known persons suspected of criminal activity, they will 
also employ “collect all” data methods to see if suspicious persons and activities 
“emerge” from the data.  In Timothy Carpenter’s case, the government was able to 
“access each carrier’s deep repository of historical location information” “[w]ith just 
the click of a button.”45  These passive forms of investigation vastly expand policing 
power.46 
Third, these technologies represent a decreasing emphasis on human skill in 
favor of automation.47  What we might have presumed to be quintessentially human 
talents in policing—identifying suspicious persons and activities and drawing 
inferences from seemingly disconnected data—are increasingly tasks assumed by 
machines.  No one in Carpenter’s situation (i.e. anyone with a cellphone) could flee 
the “inescapable and automatic nature of its collection . . . .”48  And those tasks can 
be assumed at a scale, with a speed, and with results that humans could not easily 
reproduce.  In this way, the reasoning of the Carpenter decision appears to recognize 
that police use of artificial intelligence has far surpassed merely “augmenting the 
sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth . . . .”49 
The Carpenter decision hints at the kinds of police technologies that may 
necessitate new ways of thinking about the Fourth Amendment.  The majority 
opinion does not identify these new ways of thinking definitively, but instead raises 
new and provocative questions.  Perhaps the most direct question raised by the case 
will be which new technologies will qualify as “conventional surveillance 
                                                                                                                       
43  Id. (emphasis added). 
44  Id. 
45  Id. 
46  See Sarah Brayne’s excellent discussion of how these technologies have change policing 
within the LAPD.  Sarah Brayne, Big Data Surveillance, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 977, 990 (2017) (“The shift 
from query-based to alert-based systems, represents, in part . . . a fundamental transformation in 
surveillance activities.”). 
47  Elizabeth E. Joh, Automated Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 559 (2018). 
48  138 S. Ct. at 2223 (emphasis added). 
49  United States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081, 1086 (1983). 
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techniques and tools” and thus trigger no Fourth Amendment protections.50  The 
likely questions to be raised here will include the use of facial recognition 
technology in public spaces, particularly if they become incorporated into police 
body cameras intended for ordinary patrol use.51 
The Court’s decision, however, to focus not only on the quality of the 
information collected but also the method of policing used to obtain it suggests that 
novel forms of technology-enhanced policing may trigger new Fourth Amendment 
protections.  The security camera will longer be the paradigm of policing 
technology.  Many objects besides cellphones are or will be connected to the internet 
and each other.52  Cloud computing will shift our perceptions of what a single source 
of data collection, storage, and analysis is.  And increasingly our definition of 
policing may include responses to automated alerts.  Or perhaps even automated 
responses to those automated alerts. 
In other words, if part of what provides a person Fourth Amendment protection 
from surveillance is the fact that the policing method involved could be 
characterized as superhuman, passive, and automated, what other techniques might 
fall in that category?  If police use 24-hour-a-day patrol robots capable of identifying 
people and vehicles in public spaces, are all of them engaged in perpetual Carpenter-
type searches?  If such robots are connected by cloud computing, how many 
Carpenter-type searches are taking place at once? 
Moreover, the Court’s concerns about a type of tireless, automated, and 
inescapable data collection would seemingly characterize “smart” cities planned for 
the future.53  These visions of urban life in the future imagine an infrastructure 
characterized by a network of sensors intended to regulate traffic flow, respond to 
                                                                                                                       
50  138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
51  The CEO of Axon, the company responsible for selling most of the police body cameras in 
the United States, has predicted that their cameras will soon incorporate facial recognition technology.  
See Drew Harwell, Facial Recognition May Be Coming to a Police Body Camera Near You, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/26/facial-
recognition-may-be-coming-to-a-police-body-camera-near-you/?utm_term=.2cdaff767510 (reporting 
that facial recognition technology “is ‘under active consideration’” at Axon).  In 2017, Axon acquired 
AI startup Dextro to help automate body camera video analysis.  See Alfred Ng, Police Hear a Pitch 
for Free Body Cameras, with a Side of AI, CNET (Apr. 5, 2017, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/police-free-body-cameras-artificial-intelligence-taser-axon-vievu/. 
52  See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 
104 CAL. L. REV. 805, 813 (2016) (“Experts predict that the worldwide scale of such ‘smart,’ 
interconnected objects will continue to grow, reaching more than fifty billion objects in 2020, and one 
trillion by 2025 . . . .  The result will be additional options for government surveillance that can reveal 
the patterns of everyday life.”). 
53  Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing the Smart City, INT’L J. L. CONTEXT (forthcoming 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3189089. 
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emergencies, and manage energy consumption.54  Those very same sensors are ideal 
methods of data collection for law enforcement as well. 
Finally, if I am right about the Court’s forward-looking approach to the Fourth 
Amendment and policing methods, it may begin to cast doubt on the extreme 
deference courts have given to the judgments of human police officers.  Others have 
written extensively about the judicial reluctance to second guess police 
determinations of suspicion and the use of force.55  Such deference presumes an 
accumulation of individual and institutional skill that is human, and to some extent, 
unknowable.  But if the future of policing is automated, those assumptions may not 




The use of artificial intelligence is nowhere to be found in the Carpenter 
decision.  Indeed, the Court ends its decision eager to cabin it, “to ensure that we do 
not ‘embarrass the future.’”56  But in its choices to describe why the locational data 
obtained by the government warranted Fourth Amendment protection, the Court 
recognized not only the qualitatively distinct features of the information, but also 
the type of policing involved in obtaining it.  This way of describing investigation—
superhuman, passive, and automated—also happens to characterize the use of 
artificial intelligence in policing.  And as technologies become more powerful and 
prevalent in ordinary law enforcement, those clues suggest what will concern the 
Court in the future. 
                                                                                                                       
54  Id. at 1. 
55  See, e.g., Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 864 (2014) (“In the 
context of determining whether a police use of force was constitutionally permissible, the Court has 
concluded that the circumstances in which police use force justify deference to the officers’ 
decisions.”). 
56  138 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 64 S. Ct. 950, 955 (1944)). 
